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A quantitative approach to the evaluation of alternative organizational
forms is presented. The method is extended to the case when the designer
cannot assume that the organization members have the same perception of the
task requirements as he does. Two three-person organizations are used to
illustrate the approach.
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ABSTRACT 2. THE DESIGN PROBLEM
A quantitative approach to the evaluation of 2.1 Model of the Task
alternative organizational forms is presented. The
method is extended to the case when the designer A task consists of receiving data (signals),
cannot assume that the organization members have the processing that data, and producing an output in the
same perception of the task requirements as he does. form of actions or signals. The input data can
Two three-person organizations are used to illustrate originate from a single source or from many different
the approach. sources. The data may be a single element or a set of
elements. In general, it is modeled as a vector, x,
1. INTRODUCTION generated by a single source. This vector signal is
partitioned by partitioning matrices n and allocated
When the tasks which have to be performed exceed to the appropriate decisionmakers. A task can be
the capabilities of a single person, organizations specified fully by its finite scheme, which consist of
are formed, consisting of individuals interacting with the task's alphabet and its probability distribution,
each other in specified ways. The most important i.e.,
characteristic of the organizations considered here is
that their task involves information processing and
decisionmaking. The qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of this class of organizations is carried X = (X, P) =
out within an information theoretic framework and is P P
a direct continuation of the work by R. F. Drenick
[1], K. L. Boettcher, and A. H. Levis, [2], [3], [4].
2.2 Model of the Decisionmaker
In developing the model of organizations, several
simplifying assumptions have been made: (a) designers The basic model of the memoryless decisionmaker
and decisionmakers have identical knowledge of the with bounded rationality is based on the hypothesis of
tasks' uncertainty, i.e., the probability distribution F. C. Donders [5] that information processing is done
of the tasks and (b) identical perception of the value in stages. Specifically, it is assumed that the two
of each task. These assumptions are very restrictive stages are: (a) situation assessment, and (b) response
and often unjustifiable. In general, it is very selection. The structure of the basic model has been
difficult to assess the probability distribution of extended by Boettcher and Levis [2] to include
the tasks; it is also unlikely that the designer interactions between decisionmakers as shown in
and the decisionmakers have the same perception Figure 1. It is assumed that the overall task x is
of the tasks' probability distribution. In this partitioned by matrix ~n and that only the
paper, this assumption is relaxed. It is assumed appropriate elements of x are allocated to the n-th
that the designer knows the tasks' real probability decisionmaker. The decisionmaker processes the data
distribution, while the decisionmaker's perception using the algorithms in the SA stage in order to
of this distribution is different. The second assess the situation. The assessed situation, 2 n, is
assumption that all tasks are of equal value is also then processed in the RS stage, where the decision of
improbable; usually, different tasks have different an appropriate action or response, yn, is made. Which
utilities, i.e., different weights are assigned to ones of the SA and RS algorithms a decisionmaker will
them by the designer. Therefore, the second use depends on his choice of internal decision
assumption must be weakened, so that each task can strategy, Dfk. For the situation assessment stage,
be weighted differently. In order to pose these it is assumed that the strategy un is independent of
problems properly, two additional assumptions must the input xn, whereas in the response selection stage
be introduced: (a) there is no communication between vn depends on the value of the assesed situation "n.
the designer and the decisionmakers and (b) the The assumption that the choice of un is not dependent
designer knows the tasks' uncertainty as perceived on xn has been relaxed in recent work by Chyen and
by each decisionmaker in the organization, as well Levis [6].
as the relative weights assigned by them to each
task. In order to make communication and interaction
between decisionmakers possible, two additional
functional elements are added to the model: (a)
information fusion (IF), and (b) command
interpretation (CI). The IF process allows sharing of
information on the state of environment between
*This work was supported by the Army Research decisionmakers. This functional element associates
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences under information on the assessed situation obtained by the
Contract Number MDA903-83-C-0196. n-th decisionmaker, zn, and the corresponding
information sent to him from the rest of organization, The workload in the information theoretic
z
0n
, and gives the cumulative updated information on framework is defined as the activity necessary to
the state of environment zn. It is also possible for reduce uncertainty and arrive at a decision. For any
the n-th decisionmaker to communicate his knowledge on arbitrary information processing system it is defined
the state of environment zno to other members of the as
organization, who accept and fuse that information
with their own in the corresponding IF stage. i i
Commands von received by the n-th decisionmaker from G = (w p(w) log (w (3)
the rest of the organization can modify or even i i j
override his own decision vn.
where wi is the J-th value from the alphabet of the i-
REST OF ORGANIZATION (RO) th internal variable. When the tasks' finite scheme
X, organizational structure (algorithms and protocols)
_ Z~RO _ ~RO ~ and organization's behavioral strategy A, Eq. (2), are
- sAR O .- RSRO specified, it is then possible to evaluate the
activity of each decisionmaker within the
organization, i.e.,
Gn Gn(A) - p(w ) log p(wi) (4)
=rYYi j
where w denotes the internal variables of the n-th
. zo Z." 0Vodecisionmaker. It has been shown [2], [8] that the
total activity G is the convex function of the
…-r- . ___  -mr-'7r'~ -- ___________ > - ~I I decision strategy A in the sense that
.~...~ u" ·
,nl " I (xe A h----~IF(~ LG(A) ... G(Alk) kN Pkp kN (5)I5 sown, I · k kN..
n-th DECISIONMAKER where G(Ak .. kN) is the workload corresponding to the
pure strategy.
Figure 1. Model of the Single Decisionmaker with
the Rest of the Organization A limiting feature of the single decisionmaker is
his bounded rationality. It is an expression of his
2.3 Acyclical Organizational Structure cognitive limitations and has been modeled [2], [3] as
a constraint on his total activity
An information processing organization receives,
processes and produces signals or actions: it
consists of a number of decisionmakers. The pattern in Gn(A) < Fnv (6)
which the information is allowed to flow between the
members within the organization is assumed to be where Fn is the maximum rate at which the n-th
acyclical in order to avoid deadlock or circulation of decisionmaker can process information and v is the
messages within the organization. mean interarrival time of tasks.
2.4 Workload and Performance The organization's performance is defined as
The two fundamental quantities describing
decisionmakers (DMs) and decisionmaking organizations J Ed(yy) = d(y ,y ) p(y Ix )p(x
are the workload or the activity level of each J j J)i i
indidivudal DM and the performance index of the i (7)
organization. Both of them are functions of the
input, the decisionmakers' internal structures, the where y is the actual output of the organization as a
organization's protocol or standard operating whole in response to the input xi and where y' is the
procedures and the decision strategy. For a specified desired output as defined by the organization's
input, a protocol and an internal structure (set of designer. The comparison function d(y,y') can take
algorithms) both the performance and the workload any form appropriate to the particular problem: in its
depend parametrically on the organizational behavioral simplest form it is defined as
strategy which is defined as
0 , y=y'
A [= {D (p1 ) . . ., DN (p ) ) d(y,y') = (8)
. - ~Df~pl) ,.... 1N~pN~) , yy'
N P l N (2) In that case, the performance index is reduced to the
= .2 A k.. kN k PkN (2) probability of producing an incorrect response, i.e.,
k' kN the probability of making an error.
The performance measure has meaning only for the
where Dn(pn) is the n-th decisionmaker's mixed organization as a whole and can be expressed as
decision strategy, and Akl'd..ie denotes a pure
strategy of the organization (see G. Owen [71, and
Levis and Boettcher (3]).
strategies that are feasible. The higher it is, the
N more consistent the decisions of the organization will
J(A,) = ' ak'....kN PJkL- - PkN (9) be with the design specifications. A second
kl kN interpretation of the measure is the following: if
all organizational decision strategies are equally
probable, then Q is the probability that the
to show its dependence on the choice of an organization will make a decision that satisfies the
organizational strategy. The designer is the one who individual bounded rationality constraints and leads
assigns the value of the performance threshold (J) to satisficing performance. Hence, Q is bounded
which the decisionmaking organization has to meet, increasing function of the performance threshold J
i.e., and individual decisionmaker's activity threshold
(Fns, n = 1....,N), i.e.,
J (A) J (10)
o < Q(·J,) < 1 (14)
This condition determines the set of strategies that
yield satisficing performance. It is equal to zero if there is no decision strategy
for which it meets the specifications of the task,
2.5 Performance - Workload Locus while its value is equal to unity if all admissible
decision strategies satisfy the requirements. It is
For each decision strategy, the organization's evident that the higher value of the mutual
performance and the workload of each one of the N consistency measure Q the better performance can be
decisionmakers can be computed. The performance- expected from that system. Therefore, the designer
workload locus, So. is defined in the (N+1)- can compare systems with respect to Q and select the
dimensional space S as the set of all points one with the highest value of Q for a given J and T.
(J,G1 ,...,GN) that correspond to the set of all
admissible decisions strategies. Let Z be the set of 3.0 TWO POINTS OF VIEW
all admissible strategies of the organization; then
The basic premise in all previous work is that
the designer knows the finite scheme, Eq. (1), and the
= (~ , .... ) (11) performance index and that he assumes the
decisionmakers in the organization will have the same
where in is the set of admissible strategies of the n- knowledge. On that basis, he can design an
th decisionmaker. organizational form and evaluate it. However, the
question arises as to how robust the design is, i.e.,
how sensitive is the value of Q to the assumption that
The bounded rationality constraint for each DM,
Eq. (6) is expressed simply as a bounding hyperplanhe decisionmakers have indeed the same knowledge.
in the performance-workload space; the satisficing taSuppose that they have different perceptions of the
constraint, Eq. (10), is also a bounding hyperplane tasks uncertainty and the individual decisionmakersthe individual tasks. The individual decisionmakers
that intersects the J axis at J.
who only receive partial information about the
The performance-workload locus can be used to organization's tasks may have a different perception
of the probability distribution p(x). Furhtermore.
compare qualitatively two different organizational of the probability distribution p(x). Furhtermore,their local objectives may distort the values of the
structures or designs that are to perform the same
task- [4]. It can also be used to compare the weights assigned to each task by the designer who
effectiveness of the same organization in dealing with maintains a global perspective.
different degrees of uncertainty, i.e., for different The designer can adopt two points of view in
probability distributions of the input alphabet X order to study the robustness of his design. First,
order to study the robustness of his design. First,
luThi.s qualitative analysis is based on how well the he can assume that the DMs will operate on the basis
locus So meets the requirements of Eqs. (6) and (10). of his perception of task uncertainty. p(x), and
A quantitiave approach to the comparison and objective function J. Or, he can assume that the DMs
effectiveness analysis of organizational forms is will operate on the basis of a different perception of
based on comparisons not in the performance-workload task uncertainty, e.g., q(, and that they will
space, but in the strategy space [4]. Bounded assign different values, c(x), to the various tasks
rationality constraints, Eq. (6), and performance xi.
requirements, Eq. (10), partition the space of
requirements, Eq. (10), pa tition the space of These two points of view lead to the formulation
organization strategies into a set of feasible
of four problems that the designers must analyze.
strategies that lead the points in the performance-
workload locus that satisfy constraints Eq. (6) and
(10), and a set that does not. The set of feasible
r(10), and a set that does not. The set of feasible objective probability distribution of the tasks, p(x),
and the weighting coefficients for the various tasks.
For simplicity, it is assumed that all the
A: J(A) {AJ G') ... ,G (A) < F Ns coefficients c(x) are equal to unity for the basecase.
(12)
Problem 2: (Task Uncertainty) The DMs have their own
Then, a measure of effectiveness, called the perception of the probability distribution of the
consistency measure, can be defined [41:instead of p(x), but assign the sameinput, q(x) instead of p(x), but assign the same
values to the tasks as the designer (c(x) = 1).
Q = V(I )/V(2) (13)
Problem 3: (Task Value) The DMs know the objective
where V is a volume in the N-dimensional strategy probability distribution to the tasks, p(x), but
space. Therefore, Q denotes the fraction of all assign different values of the various tasks, i.e.,
their c(x) differs from the designer's (c(x) i 1).
Problem 4: (General Problem) The DMs have their own
perception of the probability distribution of the
input, q(x), and the value of the tasks.
Problem 1 is the one that has been analyzed in
detail in [2], (31, and [4] while Problem 4 is the DMI
general case; Problems 1, 2, and 3 are really special
cases of 4. In this paper, Problem 2 is analyzed 8
because it addresses the complex interrelationship A'
between uncertainty and workload. h
It is possible to develop the analytical
expressions for the workload as a function of p(x) and DM2
of q(x). It is also possible to introduce weighted t a 2
entropy, [91, and derive the expressions for the
difference in the workload Gn due to the difference in _
the perception of the task uncertainty by the designer /
and the decisionmakers. However, the analytical
expressions have not yielded yet any particular
insight to the problem. Consequently, the sensitivity z_
analysis will be described in terms of an example that
has been introduced in an earlier study [31]. [10].
4.0 THREE PERSON ORGANIZATIONS u DM3
_ 8y hs/
Two three-person organizations have been used to t A'
illustrate the analysis and comparison of alternative h3
organizational forms. The first one, Organization A, h_
illustrates a parallel structure while Organization B
is a hierarchical one. The two organizations are
shown in Figures 2 and 3, respectively, where the
Petri Net formalism is used [101. Since the
description of the organizations, their protocols and 9 Figure 2. Organization A: Parallel Structure
the air defense task that they model have been
described in [31, they will not be repeated here.
Only the task model will be described in some detail,
since the probability distribution of the input x is
the key issue in Problem 2.
A threat is modeled by an ordered pair of points
in a two dimensional space. The two points are DM1 h .
assumed to be measurements defining the trajectory of
the threat. It is also assumed that time interval
between the points is known, so that the speed of the
threat can be calculated. In the parallel f' 8
organization, A, the threat area is divided into three
sectors, each one assigned to one of the three
decisionmakers. If a threat lies entirely within a
sector, i.e., both points are in one sector, then the
corresponding DM assesses the situation and generates
a response. If a threat crosses the boundary between
two sectors, then the DM with the sector within which
the second (or latter) point lies is expected to
provide the response. However, the adjacent DM must h
communicate information: the data about the first (or 
earlier) point. In order to avoid complex protocols, 
it is assumed that no more than one threat can be in
each sector and there can be only one threat that
crosses sectors at a time. These assumptions avoid z32 y
two conflicts: (a) one DM having to decide about two
threats at the same time and (b) the center DM
receiving simultaneously data from the other two DMs DM38
and having to assess two threats simultaneously. nu'
Actually, the second assumption can be relaxed so that h 
two threats that cross boundaries can be present
provided they do so on different boundaries and the
net result is such that a single DM does not have to h
respond to both of them.
Fourteen different threat configurations are
possible. If one distinguishes between fast or slow
threats, then a total of forty two configurations are
possible. Figure 3. Organization B: Hierarchical Structure
In organization B, the situation is rather every 22 units of time on the average. All strategies
different. There are two main sectors with DMI and are feasible, if the threats arrive every 42 or more
DM3 being responsible for the threats in each sector, units of time. On that basis, they can choose
respectively. The two DMs, however, do not share strategies they believe to be feasible, but which in
information directly. Instead, they pass information reality will cause overload and, consequently, a
about threats at or near their common boundary to the degradation of performance, possibly a severe one.
coordinator (DM') who assesses the situation and Very similar observations can be made by comparing the
assigns the threat to the appropriate DM. Q loci of organization B, Figs. 6 and 7. In that
case, too, the Q locus for the objective probability
For the evaluation of the performance-workload is farther from the origin than the locus resulting
locus, forty five threat sets were used representing when the perceived uncertainty by the decisionmakers
seventeen of the forty-two possible configurations. is used. The decisionmakers have underestimated the
The objective probability distribution p(x) was need for coordination to handle threats that occur
assumed to be uniform, i.e., each one of the forty near or on the boundary between the two sectors.
five threat sets was equally likely.
The assumption that a decisionmaker may select
In order to provide some contrast and also any of the admissible, but not necessarily feasible,
represent a plausible situation, the probability strategies with equal probability is not a realistic
distribution perceived by the decisionmakers, q(x), one. If the DM thinks that a certain subset Es of the
was assumed to be non-uniform. Specifically, it was decision strategy space I will meet the performance
assumed that the DMs did not take into account that and workload constraints, then he will choose
threats could cross sectors (they assigned almost zero strategies from that set only and ignore the rest.
probability to these events), but assumed uniform This can be modeled by assuming a uniform probability
probability distribution for threat sets that did not distribution for the strategies in E and assigning
include trajectories crossing sector boundaries. zero probability to the strategies not in Is . If a
decisionmaker's perception of the task's probability
The level of activity, measured by whether a distribution q(x) is such that Es is the null set,
decisionmaker expects to respond to a threat or not, then a uniform probability distribution is assumed for
is shown in Table 1. selecting a strategy from the set 7.
If the decisionmaker's q(x) is the same as the
TABLE 1. Expected Activity by DMs for p(x) and q(x) designer's, the objective probability distributi9n
p(x), then the feasible strategy set is denoted by >o.
The relative position,'of the two strategy sets, the
DM STATUS p(x) q(x) one due to to q(x), 5s, and the one due to p(x), lo'
ORG A ORG B ORG A ORG B may be such that the two sets are disjoint,
overlapping, or identically, the same. Therefore, in
1 Active 49% 91%k 76%k 82% selecting a strategy from Ls, the decisionmaker may be
1 nactive 51 91 24 82 selecting a strategy that meets the specifications of
the task as seen by the designer or he may not. In
order to analyze the relationship between Es and 
the consistency measure introduced in Eq. (13) is
Inactive 16 18 62 62 modified as follows:
3 Active 51% 89% 59% 64%
Inactive 49 11 41 36 V( )/V(7 for V(1s) = O
V(Y) V(Z0 )
The active status denotes either autonomous operation Q(Jo) = r V(fs) > 0 (15)
- the DM receives a threat in his sector and responds V(s)
to it -- or interaction with another DM by sharing
situation assessment information. 1 for V() = V(
5.0 RESULTS
where V(') is again the volume in the strategy space.
The consistency measure Q for the parallel The quantity Q can be interpreted as the probability
organization A and task probability distribution p(x) that a decisionmaker, who perceives the probability
and q(x) is shown in Figures 4 and 5, while Figures 6 distribution of the tasks as being q(x), will select a
and 7 are the corresponding plots for a hierarchical decision strategy that satisfies the requirements
Organization B. (J,=).
Figure 4 shows that there are no strategies that The example of Organizations A and B and the
the organization members can use that will not lead to probability distributions p(x) and q(x) introduced
overload, if the interarrival time x is less than 32 in Section 4 are used now to illustrate the modified
units of time. Furthermore, if r is more than 52 consistency measure Q. From plots of the consistency
units then no strategy will overload the DMs. The measures of Q, Figures 4 and 5 and the plot of the
fraction of strategies that satisfy the bounded modified consistency measure in Figure 8, the
rationality constraints is a non-decreasing function following observations can be made. For very low
of v. as shown by the gradual, step like increases in threshold values, J < 2.4 and v < 22, there are no
Q. Now consider Figure 5. This shows the effect of strategies for which DMs can meet the workload and
underestimating the task requirements by the performance requirements. For values of the
decisionmakers. By neglecting to take into thresholds
consideration the common occurence of threats that
cross over from one sector to another and the 2.4 S J < 4.9 22 < % < 32
resulting need for communication and coordination,
they perceive that they can handle threats arriving the DMs think that there are strategies that satisfy
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the requirements, but in reality there are not: Q
remains zero because the intersection of Es and 0 < J < 2.4 and 0 < ' ( 224 is null. For values of v between 32 and 52,
the probability with which they will select a there are no decision strategies with which the
feasible (from the designer's point of view) strategy organization can meet the performance requirements and
varies.. For values of J > 5.2 and r > 52, the measure the workload constraints, and the DMs are aware of
Q is unity, i.e., all admissible strategies are that. For
feasible.
2.4 < J < 4.9 and 22 < r < 32
From the plots of Q in Figures 6 and 7 and the
plot of the modified consistency measure Q, Figure 9, there exist feasible strayegies, but the DMs are
similar observations can be made for Organization B. not aware of them. Since E is null, the DMs may
For J < 1.1 and x < 22, there are no feasible decision choose strategies from E at random and, therefore,
strategies. For the probability of selecting a feasible one is equal
to the value of Q (Figure 5). For larger values of
1.1 < J < 3.1 and 22 < r < 32 the thresholds J and x, the two sets and
intersec_; at the point J = 4.9 and x = 3.2, is
there are strategies that appear to the DMs to within and stays within it from then on.
be feasible, as shown in Figure 7, but in reality
they are not. Consequently, while Q is nonzero, Q Similar behavior is observed for Organization B,
is zero. In the region 32 < v < 45, in contrast as indicated by the Q locus in Figure 11.
to Organization A, the intersection 's O is
increasing faster than s . For J > 4.4 and = > 45, Finally, comparison of the Q plots for
all strategies are feasible. Interesting insights are Organization A, Figures 8 and 10 (or Organization B,
obtained, if the assumptions of p(x) and q(x) are Figures 9 and 11) shows that the effectiveness of each
reversed. Suppose that the actual threat set does not organization structure is sensitive to the knowledge
include threats that cross boundaries, i.e., of the input. If the decisionmakers underestimate
p1 (x)=q(x), but that the DMs assume that there are, the task requirements, degradation of performance
q (x)=p(x). While the Q plots for Organization A will occur, while if the designer underestimates
remain the same, but with Fig. 5 representing the the workload requirements of the task, but the
designer's point of view and Fig. 4 the DMs, the Q decisionmakers are aware of them, then the
plot is quite different., For organization will be as effective as it can be.
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Figure 9. Modified Consistency M'easure Qfor Organization A
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